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LIEN POSITION AND
MARKET RATING
Two indicators of credit quality have been found to be associated with
the ultimate success or failure of bond investments, namely, agency
ratings and earnings coverage. This chapter considers two other quality
indicators of corporate bonds: lien position and market rating. Lien
position refers to whether or not the debt is secured; market rating, to
how the market itself rates the bond.
Lien Position
A principal lesson of the 1930's to the bond investor was that the
presence of specific security or the manner in which a debt obligation
was secured had little to do with whether or not it ultimately went
to default. Indeed, Hickman's study of the period from 1900 to 1943
showed that security was inversely related to earnings; that is, com-
panies with low earnings coverage offered a greater proportion of
secured issues. Thus, earnings and the security provision could be
considered substitutes to a degree.1
In much of the period Hickman was analyzing, unsecured and junior
obligations suffered relatively fewer defaults than did senior and se-
cured obligations, because only strong corporations were able to finance
with debentures, except in periods of excessive optimism.2 Among
defaulting bonds, however, security and rank of claims had a large
bearing on the loss rate. For example, while 18.8 per cent of large
secured issues went into default (compared with 13.6 per cent unse-
cured), the loss rate was only 8.0 per cent (compared with 16.6 per
cent When both the possibility of default and of loss
resulting from default are considered, the difference between large
secured and unsecured issues is not great. On all large issues (non-
defaulted plus defaulted), 5.4 per cent was realized on secured and
1 See W. Braddock Hickman, Corporate Bond Quality and Investor Experience,
Princeton for NBER, 1958, p. 392 tIE.
2 Ibid., pp. 447 if.
S Ibid., Tables 93 and 97, pp. 448 and 462.Lien Position and Market Rating 67
TABLE 27
Lien Position of Public and Direct Offerings 1944-65




















Source:1900-43: Hickman, Corporate Bond Quality andinvestor
Experience, Table 91, p. 437; 1944-65: tabulations from Table D-1.
5.3 per cent on unsecured obligations.4 Hickman concluded that while
protection of both earnings and assets was generally rewarded by lower
defaults, large institutional investors could substitute earnings coverage
for lien position and obtain a high average realized yield.5
Table 27 shows that there has been a much lower proportion of
secured offerings in the postwar period than prevailed in the prewar
period, particularly the decade immediately prior to the war. For the
1900—43 period, about 73 per cent of the bond offerings were secured.
In contrast, the postwar average is about 42 per cent of offerings
secured.
4Ibid.,Table 98, p.466.
5Ibid.,p. 469.68 Trends in Corporate Bond Quality
CHART 11
Proportion of Offerings Secured, 1900—65
Source: Computed from Hickman,StatisticalMeasuresofCorporate Bond
Financing, Table 85, and Table D-1 of this study.
Note: Shaded areas represent business contractions; unshaded areas, expansions.
Hickman found that the proportion of unsecured obligations to
total bond offerings rose toward the end of the 1920's, mainly because
of financing by holding companies with no mortgageable assets.6
While there has been no comparable holding-company movement in
the postwar period, it may be worthwhile to study the trend of secured
versus unsecured issues, if only to determine whether the tolerance of
the market for unsecured offerings may be a symptom of deterioration
in credit quality.
Chart 11 indicates that in the prewar period business recoveries
often were characterized by a declining proportion of offerings that
bore specific security. The most notable example was the fall, prior
to the 1929 turning point, in percentage of offerings secured. In the
postwar period a slight tendency continued for recoveries to show a
falling proportion of secured offerings. However, the long secular
downdrift from 1900 to 1929 was no longer present in the postwar
period; the proportion of secured offerings leveled off at 40 per cent
in 1946.
6 Ibid., pp. 449.— w — w
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Hickman found th.at lien position at offering had little to do with
the risk of occurrence of default; in fact, the reverse seemed to be the
case sometimes, since weak corporations could only finance by offering
secured issues. Instead, past differences in ability to meet charges seemed
to have the greatest relation to incidence of default. On the other hand,
the security of the bond became important in determining the amount
of the loss when and if the bond went into default.7
Market Rating
A measure of risk in corporate bonds is afforded by the evaluation
placed upon them by investors. Presumably, a bond which the market
judges to have a minimum risk will be bid up to the point where its
yield equals the "pure" cost of long-term money plus an amount
sufficient only to cover the most remote chance of loss from default.
Similarly, a bond judged by the market to have a high degree of risk
should afford additional return beyond the pure cost of long-term
funds, this additional compensation being a measure of the market
appraisal of the chances of possible loss.
Hickman points out th.at risks on low-grade bonds were apparently
overcompensated in the 1900—43 period, so that an investor able to
diversify sufficiently received more than enough from the higher yields
on low-quality bonds to compensate for losses incurred. He suggests
that the observed facts are consistent with two hypotheses: First, the
yield on a bond consists of three elements—the pure cost of money,
a risk premium sufficient on the average to compensate for losses, and
a reward for bearing risk. Second, although the institutions which have
dominated the market in recent years can diversify adequately, they
generally choose high-grade bonds because of public regulation and
to avoid the embarrassment of large holdings of defaulted bonds.
Promised yields on low-grade bonds are thereby more than sufficient
to offset default losses.8
Of course, Hickman found that the degree of overcompensation for
losses varied with the quality of the bond. For example, whereas bonds
with the highest agency rating promised 4.5 per cent, their realized
yield was actually 5.1 per cent. Only in the subinvestment-grade bonds
7Ibid.,Table 97, p. 462.
8Ibid.,pp. 15—16 and 522-924.— _ w
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TABLE 28
Life-Span Default Rates, Yields and Loss Rates for Bonds











I 5.9 4.5 5.1 —0.6
II ' 6.0 4.6 5.0 —0.4
III 13.4 4.9 5.0 —0. 1
IV 19.1 5.4 5.7 —0.3
V-TX 42.4 9.5 8.6 0.9
No rating 28.6 4.8 4.6 0.2
Total 17.3 5.3 5.4 —0.1
Source: Hickman, Corporate Bond Quality and in vestor Experience,
Table 1, p.10.
was there a reduction from promised yield as a result of losses. Table
28 summarizes these findings.
Hickman's findings that yields on less than prime-quality bonds
greatly overcompensate for the calculation of risks involved has recently
been re-examined with the aim of eliminating the effect of calls and
high terminal valuations in 1944, a low interest rate year, from realized
yields. Table 29 shows that the modified loss rate (difference between
promised and modified realized yield) is much greater for lower grades
vis-à-vis high-grade bonds. Promised yields, as reflected in the "market
rating" placed on bonds, hence measure bond quality.
Many factors not related to quality also affect the promised yield,
among them term to maturity. Bonds convertible into common stock
offer something more than the promised return on comparable non-
convertible bonds, and therefore command yields often not fully com-
mensurate with the risk of default. Particularly in times of optimism,
convertible bonds may be valued as common stock. Similarly, variations
in call features can affect the prospect of the bond's life and, therefore,
the potentiality of the holder's realizing a capital gain with changes in
interest rates. (All of this would affect investors' appraisals.) The size
of the issue and the volume of outstanding debt of the particular firm—_ _
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TABLE 29
Yield Experience on Corporate Bonds as Determined by Hickman and






AgencyRating Yield (Hickman) (Frame and Mills)
I 4.5 5.1 4.3
II 4.5 5.1 4.3
III 4.9 5.0 4.3
IV 5.4 5.8 4.5









Source: Harold G. Frame and Robert H. Mills, "Effect of Defaults
and Credit Deterioration on Yields of Corporate Bonds," Journal of
Finance, September 1961, p. 431.
or industry can affect investors' appraisals. Their normal diversification
requirements may make particular issues more or less attractive than
others. Thus, utility bonds often have a larger yield than equally good
industrial bonds simply because institutional investors have heavy
portfolios of utility issues which, during most of the postwar period,
have been in ample supply.
In periods of high interest rates, bonds with low coupons sell at a
deep discount from par, but often are priced to yield less than bonds
selling nearer to par, because investors prefer capital gains rather than
current yield and expect the interest rate cycle to reverse. Also, an
active sinking fund may contribute to yield differences not commensu-
rate with quality by creating a shortage in the particular issue.
Despite the difficulties in considering the spread from prime bonds
as a measure of quality, there are good reasons to treat this measure
with some respect. Valuation of bonds requires a considerable body
of techniques that have been developed over many years. Unlike
stocks—where growth-of-earnings possibilities, dividends, and liquidat-72 Trends in Corporate Bond Quality
ing value intrude into the valuation formula—bond valuation, apart
from the strict mathematical relationships, is heavily influenced by the
one major event that can occur to the instrument, namely, default.
Consequently, slight gradations in price and therefore yield reflect
market estimates of, among other things, bond quality.
The means used here to determine the yield on best-grade corporate
bonds was developed by Durand.8 It includes plotting yields against
maturity for a large number of high-grade bonds. A line is drawn
representing the lower margin of yields for the sample, disregarding
a few issues with very low yields because of extraneous influences. After
determining the schedule of yields for each maturity, a measure of the
market rating for any given issue may be obtained by subtracting the
appropriate basic yield from the issue's yield. Generally, in this study,
Hickman's practice of classifying bonds with yields at offering of less
than 1 per cent above the basic corporate bond yield as high grade is
followed. Those selling at I per cent or more above the basic yield
are considered substandard risks.
Another difficulty with a measure of market rating representing the
difference between prime bonds and a specified bond is that at different
periods "the market" has valued the same quality bonds differently.
This is most commonly seen in the so-called confidence index familiar
to stock investors. The measure, the ratio of Aaa to Baa bond yields,
is shown in Chart 12. While it is affected by Hickman's finding that
the agencies during the period 1914—43 "rated bonds up in expansions
and down in contractions," 10mostof its movement is a change in
public valuation of different grades of bonds. As a result, the ratio
varied from .54 in 1932 to .92 in 1965. The reduction in difference in
Aaa and Baa yields (curve moving up) is one aspect of the finding that
market ratings have improved over the period since 1919. It does not
explain the 1954—60 dip and recovery.
Because of the multiplicity of yields necessary for serial bonds, yields,
and therefore market ratings, were computed only for straight bonds
in the early period. In the postwar data, practically all direct place-
ments had some form of repayment arrangement similar to,if not
exactly the same, as that of serial bonds.
Table 30 shows that the early postwar period improved substantially
9DavidDurand, Basic Yields of Corporate Bonds, 1900—1942, New York, National
Bureau of Economic Research, 1942.
10CorporateBond Quality, pp.173f.Lien Position and Market Rating 73
CHART 12
Percentage of Offerings with High-Grade Market Ratings Related
to Changes in Quality Premium, 1919—65 a
Source: Based on Hickman, Statistical Measures of Corporate Bond Financing,
Table 70, p. 113; Table E-l of this study; and Moody's bond yields by rating
groups. (All corporate bonds, annual averages from blue section of Moody's Indus-
trial Manual.)
aRatioof yields on Aaa bonds to those on Baa bonds, annual averages of
monthly indexes.
over the prewar period in the percentage of par amount of bond offer-
ings rated by the market as high grade, i.e., with a yield less than 1 per
cent above that of the basic yield in the year offered. There was some
deterioration in the late fifties, and quality by this measure was about
back to that of the period 1928—31. Then it rose again and was higher
in 1964—65 than in any of the four-year periods. The percentage of
bonds rated high grade would differ somewhat if, instead of constant
differential (1 per cent), a cOnstant ratio of differential to basic rate
were used, but there would still be a larger proportion of high grades
in all postwar years except 1956—59 than in years before 1944.
Hickman, using outstandings and "net upgradings," found little
cyclical behavior in the market rating. In the postwar period, virtually
no discernible cyclical behavior is present for public offerings. While
the whole period is sharply dominated by the 1954—57 dip and subse-
quent recovery in the new-issue volume rated as high grade (offering-. - --w- w —
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TABLE 30
Percentage Distribution of Par Amount of Straight Corporate
pond Offerings Among High and Low Market Ratings at
Offering, Four-Year Periods, 1900-65
Period of
Offerings High Grade Low Grade
1900-03 43.1 56.9
1904-07 41.9 58.1















Source:1900-43; based on Hickman, Corporate Bond Quality and
'Investor Experience, Table 54, p. 298; 1944-65:based on Table E-l.
Note: High-grade issues are those with offering yields less than
100 basis points in excess of the basic yield. Beginning in 1944 only
public offerings are included. Based on rated bonds only.
aTwo..year period.
yield less than one percentage point above basic yield), there is a very
modest tendency for a greater proportion of issues tO be rated good. in
recession years than in the previous peak years. In general, however,
the cyclical performance of the market rating is subordinate to ob-
viously stronger secular movements.Lien Position and Market Rating 75
Themarket rating probably has lost much of the efficiency, as a
quality indicator that it exhibited in the earlier Hickman period
because such a great proportion of the dollar volume of bond issues
now escapes the market process, even though market alternatives are
not without influence. It has been particularly poor in the postwar
period because of the rise of convertible issues. The market rating is
a generally poor indicator of quality since it is affected by many in-
fluences not related to quality. Nevertheless, the results of our market
rating analysis corroborates other indications that in the postwar
period quality is better than prewar. The search for earnings in the
last several years, however, has driven down yields on even poorer-
quality bonds (as measured by other criteria), so that it is likely spuri-
ous indications of the recent trend in quality are obtained from the
use of the market rating.